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A Rhetorician’s Practical Wisdom
by Linda L. Berger*
“We tell them what we have learned about the world by trying to
prevent and resolve disputes through rhetoric.”1
Introduction
For three years, I had the great good fortune to work in the office next
to Jack Sammons. My good fortune extended to a coincidence of timing
that allowed me to work with Jack on a co-authored article, The Law’s
Mystery.2 During the time I worked next door, I felt cursed by an
inability to grasp concepts that to Jack appeared inevitable and
essential, whether those inevitabilities and essences were to be found
within the law, good lawyering, or good legal education. The curse
persisted throughout the writing of The Law’s Mystery.
For Jack, the essence of a life well lived within the law could be found
in the phrase practical wisdom and for me, that phrase was the mystery.
It’s not that there were no definitions: instead, they were too simple or
too many, too diverse or too abstract. Where were the living stories of
* Family Foundation Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School
of Law. University of Colorado-Boulder (B.S., 1970); Case Western Reserve University Law
School (J.D., 1985). Thank you to Jack Sammons, who is the reason for this Article but not
to blame for it. I very much appreciate the conversation fostered by the Rhetoric & Law
Colloquium focusing on District of Columbia v. Heller and sponsored by the University of
Alabama in Huntsville and Stetson University College of Law in April 2014. And many
thanks to my research assistant, Aleem A. Dhalla.
1. Jack L. Sammons, A Sixth Semester Conversation, 100 DICK. L. REV. 625, 630 (1996).
2. Linda L. Berger & Jack L. Sammons, The Law’s Mystery, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD.
1 (2013). In the introduction, with reference to the notion that this was a co-authored
article, Jack wrote, “What you are about to read is not what it appears to be.” Id. at 2.
Rather than two authors offering a theory and then applying it, “the authors did not come
together in this sense on either part, the theory or the practice. The theory is almost
entirely the work of one; the practice almost entirely the work of the other.” Id. at 3.
459
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practical wisdom at work within the law?3 Where were the concrete
images of the practically wise?4 I understood that practical wisdom grew
out of practice and grew into action. But when I attempted to seize upon
it for study and description, I chased an elusion. For this Symposium
honoring Jack’s scholarship, I decided to see again if I could catch a
glimpse.
What is Practical Wisdom?
Although substituting “reason” for “wisdom,” here is a concise
beginning: “Practical reason is the general human capacity for resolving,
through reflection, the question of what one is to do.”5 This kind of
wisdom is practical because it grows out of the need to act and because
it results in action. And it is wisdom because it resolves the question and
because it does so through reflection. Practical reason asks “what one
ought to do, or what it would be best to do” and it does so “from a
distinctively first-personal point of view, one that is defined in terms of
a practical predicament in which [we] find ourselves.”6 In contrast with
theoretical reason, practical reason “is concerned not with the truth of
propositions but with the desirability or value of actions. . . . Theoretical
reflection about what one ought to believe produces changes in one’s
overall set of beliefs, whereas practical reason gives rise to action.”7
As with so many things, Aristotle classified practical wisdom. First, he
divided the virtues into two types, moral virtue and intellectual virtue.8
Moral virtue is concerned with feelings, desires, choices, and decisions.9
“Moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice”10 and is
learned through habit and repetition.11 Intellectual virtue is developed
3. At a time when I was more critical of the story of King Solomon’s wisdom, Jack told
me to look closely there.
4. In the context of describing the “virtues carried by the practice by which we identify
good lawyering when we see it,” Jack noted that these “are observable characteristics of
the person–of what he or she has become–rather than of performances of particular
tasks–of what he or she can do.” Jack L. Sammons, Traditionalists, Technicians, and Legal
Education, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 246-47 n.28 (2003) [hereinafter Sammons, Traditional-
ists].




8. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 28 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press ed.
1980) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
9. Id. at 38.
10. Id. at 138-39.
11. Id. at 28.
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not only through practice but also requires instruction.12 Through
teaching and instruction, intellectual virtue develops as a type of
wisdom.13
Within the category of intellectual virtue, Aristotle divided once
again.14 Here, he distinguished wisdom from practical wisdom.15
While “wisdom” combined scientific knowledge and intuitive thought,
“practical wisdom . . . is concerned with things human and things about
which it is possible to deliberate.”16 The person who is practically wise
not only makes wise decisions, but recognizes the best ways in which to
act to fulfill the desired outcome.17
Practical wisdom thus fills in the gaps left by theoretical wisdom. In
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle writes,
This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have
philosophic but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of
what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things
that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz.
because it is not human goods that they seek.18
For Aristotle, practical wisdom encompassed practical knowledge
about living well.19 According to Aristotle,
Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able
to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in
some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to
health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good
life in general.20
So the possessor of practical wisdom is able not only to solve concrete
and specific human problems but also to do so within the larger context
of “the good life in general.”
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Many contemporary philosophers have attempted to classify intellectual virtues into
more specific categories. See, e.g., JASON BAEHER, THE INQUIRING MIND: ON INTELLECTUAL
VIRTUES AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (2011); James A. Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and
Doxastic Responsibility, 29 Am. Philos. Q. 331 (1992).
15. ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 144-51.
16. Id. at 146.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 142.
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Reading Justice Breyer in the District of Columbia
My second reading of Justice Breyer’s dissent in District of Columbia
v. Heller21 began as an effort to capture an example of practical
wisdom. The dissent seemed written especially for a specific audience
faced with a concrete problem at a particular time. It appeared to be an
implicit guidebook for the lower court judges who would find little to
help them in the majority’s decision, but who would nonetheless be
required to exercise judgment to make decisions in the real world.
From the outset, my instinct that Justice Breyer’s dissent might be an
example of practical wisdom did not depend on Justice Breyer’s own
explicit conclusion that his opinion is about the “practicalities, the
statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, its relation to
those objectives–in a word, the details.”22 Nor did it rely on his argu-
ment that the decisions of state cases “provide some comfort regarding
the practical wisdom of following [his preferred] approach.”23
Unlike Justice Breyer, who disputes the claim that his approach is
“judge-empowering,”24 this assessment will conclude that it is. If Justice
Breyer’s opinion is judge-empowering, however, it is because he appears
to be empowering judges (and perhaps state and city lawmakers) at
decision-making levels below the United States Supreme Court.
Although he refuses to accept the characterization that his approach
empowers judges, Justice Breyer acknowledges that his approach
“requires judgment.”25 He claims that “the very nature of the ap-
proach–requiring careful identification of the relevant interests and
evaluating the law’s effect upon them–limits the judge’s choices.”26
Moreover, he claims, “the method’s necessary transparency lays bare the
judge’s reasoning for all to see and to criticize.”27 The task of determin-
ing how the Second Amendment should apply to modern-day circum-
stances requires judgment, Justice Breyer writes, “judicial judgment
exercised within a framework for constitutional analysis that guides that
21. 554 U.S. 570, 681 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The first reading was in
preparation for the Rhetoric & Law Colloquium, supra note *.
22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 687.
23. Id. at 691.
24. Id. at 634 (majority opinion). The criticism is voiced first in Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the court. Id. Justice Scalia concludes that the Second Amendment is the product of
prior interest balancing by the people, which “surely elevates above all other interests the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id.
at 635.
25. Id. at 719 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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judgment and which makes its exercise transparent.”28 That, he
asserts, is preferable to “inconclusive historical research” combined with
“judicial ipse dixit.”29
From a rhetorical perspective, Justice Breyer begins the dissent with
an approach designed to move the audience from agreement on “easy”
starting points to agreement on the conclusion.30 He lists four points
upon which all can agree, and of those four, moves at once to the last,
the practical one that gets you to the somewhere else he apparently
wants to go, the premise that the Second Amendment right is not
absolute.31 He quickly justifies that premise by juxtaposing it with the
proposition that he implies is the majority’s unprovable claim–“that the
Amendment contains a specific untouchable right to keep guns in the
house to shoot burglars.”32
Justice Breyer delves into the historical evidence that preoccupied
Justices Scalia and Stevens in their majority and dissenting opinions,33
but concludes that the historical proof is only the beginning of the
constitutional question.34 He moves to the “process-based question: How
is a court to determine whether a particular firearm regulation . . . is
consistent with the Second Amendment?”35
And here lies the heart of any claim that Justice Breyer’s opinion–if
it does not actually exemplify practical wisdom–may empower others to
exercise it. How should a trial court judge decide a lawsuit challenging
a gun regulation on Second Amendment grounds after Heller? This
question–not the question of what the Second Amendment means–is the
question that preoccupies Justice Breyer, both explicitly and implicitly.
Justice Breyer stakes the first claim to this opinion being an exemplar
of practical wisdom. Posing the question of what constitutional standard
the court should use, a question that was brushed aside by the majority,
Justice Breyer states, and seeks to persuade us, that “[t]he question
28. Id. at 721-22.
29. Id. at 722.
30. See id. at 682-83 (“I take as a starting point the following four propositions, based
on our precedent and today’s opinions, to which I believe the entire Court subscribes.”).
31. Id. at 682-83.
32. Id. at 683.
33. Id. at 573 (majority opinion); id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Sanford Levinson
writes that “[n]either Scalia nor Stevens would earn more than a D were they real’
historians; indeed, they would have been thrown out of any self-respecting graduate
seminar in American legal history” in part because they ignored secondary scholarship and
cherry-picked from the primary sources. Sanford Levinson, Assessing Heller, 7 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 316, 326 (2009).
34. Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
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matters.”36 Responding to the majority’s argument that the D.C. law is
unconstitutional under any standard, Justice Breyer asks the practical
question that would occur to any lower court judge trying to apply the
correct framework: “How could that be?”37
From there, he sets forth a process for judgment.38 Any state gun
control regulation, he argues, would pass the rational basis standard
because it would bear a rational relationship to a legitimate objective of
seeking to prevent gun-related accidents.39 On the other hand, he
continues, no strict scrutiny standard would work because every gun
control regulation seeks to advance a compelling state interest, a
primary concern for the safety and lives of citizens.40 As a result, as a
practical matter, Justice Breyer concludes, “any attempt in theory to
apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an
interest-balancing inquiry.”41
If that’s the case, Justice Breyer argues, the Court should go ahead
and say so, that is, the Court should explicitly adopt an interest-
balancing test.42 His support for this argument is experience. Not the
experience of the Supreme Court, which has little prior experience
making decisions on this subject.43 Instead, he writes, the Court should
attend to the experience of the state courts, the “[c]ourts that do have
experience in these matters.”44 These courts, he contended, “have
uniformly taken an approach that treats empirically based legislative
judgment with a degree of deference.”45
Moving back to his role of providing guidance for lower courts, Justice
Breyer reviews the results of a test that would evaluate whether the
statute achieves its objective of saving lives.46 First, from the point of
view of the legislature (in this case, the D.C. City Council) that adopted
the statute thirty years earlier, Justice Breyer points to the committee
report finding that handguns–whose registration was restricted under
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 687-88.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 688-89.
41. Id. at 689.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 691.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 693.
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the law at issue–had “a particularly strong link to undesirable activities
in the District’s exclusively urban environment.”47
Taking on the role of the fact-finding trial court reviewing such a gun
control regulation today, Justice Breyer assesses the statistics presented
by the District and supporting amici in their briefs, and concludes that
“they present nothing that would permit us to second-guess the
Council.”48 Again, his emphasis is on the specific context: “[U]rban
areas, such as the District, have different experiences with gun-related
death, injury, and crime than do less densely populated rural areas.”49
Having presented his case, Justice Breyer presents his view of the
other side’s main quarrel, which as he sees it, is not with the statistics,
but with “the District’s predictive judgment that a ban on handguns will
help solve the crime and accident problems” that the statistics indicate
exist.50 In keeping with his reasonable tone, Justice Breyer acknowledg-
es that these arguments by the challenger might have convinced a
legislature not to adopt a handgun ban.51 But that is not the question
here:
[T]he question here is whether they are strong enough [arguments] to
destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature that
47. Id. at 695-96. This is one of many similar references to the “urban danger” theme
that Katie Rose Guest Pryal of the University of North Carolina pointed to in her analysis
of Breyer’s dissent as being preoccupied by images of urban violence. Rhetoric & Law
Colloquium, supra note *.
Justice Breyer also described the District’s law as “tailored to the life-threatening
problems it attempts to address” in an area that is “totally urban” and suffers from “a
serious handgun-fatality problem.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 714. In his conclusion, he
emphasized that “there simply is no untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the
Second Amendment to keep loaded handguns in the house in crime-ridden urban areas.”
Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
Images of urban violence permeate later opinions on the District’s subsequent gun
regulations:
The District of Columbia knows gun violence. Notorious for a time as the “murder
capital” of the United States, it recorded over 400 homicides annually in the early
1990s–more than one for every 1500 residents. While safety in the District has
improved markedly in this millennium, residents will not soon forget the violence
of the more recent past: the wounding of seven children outside the National Zoo
on Easter Monday in 2000, the triple murder at Colonel Brooks’ Tavern in 2003,
the five killed in the South Capitol Street shootings in 2010, and the twelve shot
to death inside the Washington Navy Yard only a few months ago.
Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 08-1289 (JEB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66569, *1 (D.D.C.
May 15, 2014).
48. Heller, 554 U.S. at 696 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 698.
50. Id. at 699.
51. Id. at 702.
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rejects them. And that they are not. For one thing, they can lead us
more deeply into the uncertainties that surround any effort to reduce
crime, but they cannot prove either that handgun possession diminish-
es crime or that handgun bans are ineffective. The statistics do show
a soaring District crime rate. And the District’s crime rate went up
after the District adopted its handgun ban. But, as students of
elementary logic know, after it does not mean because of it.52
Justice Breyer concludes this first section of the dissenting opinion by
writing that a judge might well feel uncertain about the proper
conclusion.53 In such circumstances, Justice Breyer writes that the
Court has said that all that is necessary is that the legislature “has
drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”54 That
standard is satisfied here: “the District’s judgment, while open to
question, is nevertheless supported by substantial evidence.’ ”55
Moreover, Justice Breyer suggests that this is the long-established
standard: “There is no cause here to depart from the standard . . . for the
District’s decision represents the kind of empirically based judgment
that legislatures, not courts, are best suited to make.”56 And because
this is a decision by a “local legislature,” it is even more appropriate to
defer. 57
Having determined the first requirement in the District’s favor–the
statute seeks to further compelling interests–Justice Breyer turns to the
burdens. First, addressing what he calls the primary objective of the
Second Amendment, “the preservation of a ‘well regulated Militia,’” the
statute burdens the primary objective “hardly at all.”58 Second,
addressing the secondary objective, an interest in hunting, “any inability
of District residents to hunt near where they live has much to do with
the jurisdiction’s exclusively urban character and little to do with the
District’s firearms laws.”59 Third, Justice Breyer concedes that the law
burdens “to some degree an interest in self-defense” because it prevents
residents from keeping loaded handguns in the home. 60
When Justice Breyer looks for other potential measures that might
further the same ends with fewer restrictions, “I see none.”61 The
52. Id.
53. Id. at 704.
54. Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
55. Id. at 704-05.
56. Id. at 705.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 706.
59. Id. at 709-10.
60. Id. at 710.
61. Id. at 710-11.
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reason, he writes, is that the goal of the handgun ban “is to reduce
significantly the number of handguns in the District” and “there is no
plausible way to achieve that objective other than to ban the guns.”62
To support the claim that there are no equally effective alternatives,
Justice Breyer cites “the empirical fact that other States and urban
centers prohibit particular types of weapons.”63
Because the District’s goals are compelling; its judgment about
whether the law would achieve those objectives is well supported; the
law imposes a burden on a constitutionally protected right; and there is
no clear less-restrictive alternative, Justice Breyer turns to the final
question: “Does the District’s law disproportionately burden Amendment-
protected interests?”64 Justice Breyer thinks not, but because he was
unable to persuade the Court, he turns to other, equally “unfortunate
consequences” of the majority decision.65
The decision will encourage legal challenges to gun regulation through-
out the Nation. Because it says little about the standards used to
evaluate regulatory decisions, it will leave the Nation without clear
standards for resolving those challenges. And litigation over the course
of many years, or the mere specter of such litigation, threatens to leave
cities without effective protection against gun violence and accidents
during that time.66
And there is yet another danger of the majority’s decision: while it
encourages a proliferation of lawsuits, the decision will “severely [] limit
the ability of more knowledgeable, democratically elected officials to deal
with gun-related problems.”67
Is this Wisdom?
Wise or not, partisans view Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent as
representing something beyond the ordinary. One law review article
declared that the lower courts’ response post-Heller represents “Justice
Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment.”68
Another commentator, Alan Gura, blamed Justice Breyer’s dissent for
the emergence of a “two-step rubberstamping process” by lower court
62. Id. at 711.
63. Id. at 712.
64. Id. at 714.
65. Id. at 718.
66. Id. (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 719.
68. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 703 (2012).
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judges who “can be counted upon to resist” Heller and McDonald v. City
of Chicago,69 the later decision that applied Heller to the states.70 In
contrast to those lower courts that had followed Justice Breyer’s dissent
and second-guessed the Framers, Mr. Gura (who has represented the
plaintiffs in a number of challenges to gun regulations) praised the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Peruta v. County of San Diego.71 “Contrary
to the prevailing approach, the Ninth Circuit took seriously the question
of what conduct the Framers understood the Second Amendment to
protect.”72
In the Triumph article, Professor Allen Rostron (who worked as a
Senior Staff Attorney at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence)
concluded that most lower court decisions post-Heller have applied a
form of intermediate scrutiny “that is highly deferential to legislative
determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on
guns being upheld.”73 Being both “cautious and practical,” lower courts
have tried to follow the Supreme Court’s holding, but “they have not
mimicked its approach.”74 According to Professor Rostron, this result
did not come about because of judicial intransigence, but instead because
Justice Scalia relied on approaches that were much more difficult for the
lower courts to follow: historical disputes about the original meaning and
traditional understandings of the Second Amendment right.75 Not only
had intermediate scrutiny carried the day, according to Professor
Rostron, but also the early results had overwhelmingly been to declare
gun regulations to be constitutional.76 Rather than massive resistance,
the lower courts had “conscientiously” tried to follow Justice Scalia’s
lead, but had nonetheless “ineluctably followed an analysis that fulfills
Justice Breyer’s forecast.”77
Partisans of Second Amendment rights consider deference to
legislative determinations to constitute judicial activism when it comes
69. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
70. Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223,
224-25 (2014). In Gura’s assessment, this is because “judges doubtless understand the
advantage of Justice Breyer’s approach in sanctioning just about any result they would like
to reach.” Id. at 228. Another recent law review article contended that the result was the
product of either simple or “massive resistance.” Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior
Courts to Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014).
71. Gura, supra note 70, at 223 & n.*; see also 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014).
72. Gura, supra note 70, at 224.
73. Rostron, supra note 68, at 703 n.*, 707.
74. Id. at 706.
75. Id. at 708.
76. Id. at 707.
77. Id. at 756.
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to firearm regulations.78 Characterizing such deference instead as
judicial restraint, Professor Rostron endorsed Fourth Circuit Judge
Harvey Wilkinson’s perspective that, given the danger of miscalculation
about Second Amendment rights, “[i]f ever there was an occasion for
restraint, this would seem to be it.”79
Reading (with and through) Jack Sammons
To return to the puzzle of practical wisdom, I will start with Jack’s
description of the “virtues carried by the practice by which we identify
good lawyering when we see it.”80 What observable characteristics of
the person distinguish the lawyer from others in the conversation?81
What “habits of thought and manners of being” are acquired through
rhetorical practice,82 so that by looking at them, we can see what
constitutes the kind of specific good judgment developed through the
practice and the study of law?83
Describing the virtues of the practice, Jack listed the following:
• the ability to recognize what is shared in competing positions;
• an attentiveness to detail, especially linguistic detail;
• an attentiveness as well to the ambiguities of language;
• a use of these ambiguities both for structuring the conversation and
analyzing the issue;
• a focus on text and a markedly different sense of its restraint;
• a rhetorical awareness of the reactions of potential audiences to each
competing position and even to each argument;
• an imaginative anticipation of future disputes;
• a realistic assessment of the situation even as a partisan in it;
• a recognition of the persuasive elements of all positions . . .;
• a very particular form of honesty;
• an insistence on practicality combined with an acceptance of
complexity;
• a shying away from broad principles and “proud words”;
• a concern with the procedures by which decisions are to be made;
• an equal concern with the quality of the roundtable conversation
itself including a concern that all voices round the table be well heard
and considered; [and]
78. Id. at 758.
79. Id. (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 476 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
80. Sammons, Traditionalists, supra note 4, at 246 n.28.
81. See id. at 238.
82. Jack L. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, 53 MERCER L. REV. 985, 985 (2002).
83. Sammons, Traditionalists, supra note 4, at 248 n.31.
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• an evaluation of positions in terms of an objective hypothetical
authoritative decision-maker who serves as stand-in for social
judgment . . . .84
When lawyers are called upon for counseling, for a rhetorician’s
practical wisdom, “[w]e tell them what we have learned about the world
by trying to prevent and resolve disputes through rhetoric.”85 Even
though this may seem both too vast and too small a claim, Jack fences
it in: “At least that is all we can offer legitimately, by which I mean as
lawyers.”86
If Jack’s characteristics are the virtues of the practice, it will be
helpful to see them in action. To illustrate her description of practical
wisdom, for example, Professor Daisy Floyd provided stories of its
exercise.87 She explained that if wisdom is acquired by cultivating such
virtues as loyalty, courage, fairness, generosity, and truthfulness,
practical wisdom goes farther and is the ability to use the virtues in
concrete and personal ways.88 Thus,
[p]ractical wisdom is nuanced and contextual; it depends upon an
understanding of the particular. It is not just the right way to do the
right thing, but is the right way to do the right thing in this situation
and for this person. [Other authors] use the example of how a doctor
delivers a bad prognosis to a patient. The question is: How does this
doctor deliver this bad prognosis to this patient at this moment? The
answer might be different when the patient is a sufferer of acute
depression whose wife begs the doctor to withhold the truth of the
prognosis to prevent a suicidal episode than with a different patient,
or for this patient at a different time, or with a different diagnosis.
Recognizing differences and acting appropriately in the face of them
requires practical wisdom.89
Practical wisdom involves a “circuit of thinking” from the particular to
the general, the concrete to the abstract, the story to the analysis, and
back again.90
84. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
85. Sammons, A Sixth Semester Conversation, supra note 1, at 630.
86. Id.
87. Daisy Hurst Floyd, Practical Wisdom: Reimagining Legal Education, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 195, 202-03 (2013).
88. Id. at 203.
89. Daisy Hurst Floyd, Pedagogy and Purpose: Teaching for Practical Wisdom, 63
MERCER L. REV. 943, 944-45 (2012) (footnote omitted).
90. Id. at 945.
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Through the acquisition and practice of virtues in a circuit of thinking,
the possessor of practical wisdom develops her sense of “fit.”91 In her
exploration of whether our relations with others come before reason,
Linda Meyer suggested that rather than universal rules, the model for
our understanding of “law” is “the common law, working itself out from
case to case, each case trailing threads of significance that can be caught
up in new webs of analogies, forging new patterns, or left adrift.”92
Justice is fittingness, the key judgments resulting from analogy rather
than deduction.93 When judgment is seen as relying on the ability to
see one thing as another, to judge is to find “an elusive sense of ‘fit’ or
relevance that cannot be specified in a rule but is ‘perceived’ by
judgment.”94 Even though finding the right fit is essential, the good
judge also has “the sense of unease that makes customs or practices that
‘used to fit’ chafe, bother, and vaguely nauseate us.”95
Preventing and Resolving Disputes Through Rhetoric
The “judges below” deliberate in contemplation of action, act in the
wake of restraints set by law, and decide in the face of constraints of
real consequences. While other commentators have traced the develop-
ment of the law post-Heller, perhaps distinctive patterns will emerge
from the rhetorical working out of disputes in judgments across the land.
Without ambiguity, there is no space for judgment.96
In the words of one appellate court grappling with the need to decide
the constitutionality of a specific gun regulation, “Heller [] left in its
wake a morass of conflicting lower court opinions regarding the proper
analysis to apply to challenged firearms regulations.”97 And when it
came to extending Heller beyond some of the easier territory, Judge





96. See Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 986 (“[A]n attentiveness as
well to the ambiguities of language; a use of these ambiguities both for structuring the
conversation and analyzing the issue.”).
97. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 688-89 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J.,
concurring). Judge Davis criticized the majority for looking to First Amendment doctrine
as a guide to analysis, saying the analogies “muddle, rather than clarify.” Id. at 687. But
he endorsed the majority’s explicit adoption of intermediate scrutiny because the statute
restricting gun possession by those convicted of domestic violence did not burden the core
right established in Heller as Chester was not a law-abiding responsible citizen. Id. at 690.
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Wilkinson cautioned that the question of the extent of the Second
Amendment’s reach beyond the home is “a vast terra incognita that
courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small
degree.”98
Given the opening of ambiguity, courts made “common sense”
adjustments. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook adjusted the
framework because “an attempt to operationalize the Heller Court’s
‘longstanding’ language would lead to ‘weird’ results unconnected even
to any court’s divination of the ratifiers’ original intent.”99 So he read
the Court’s language to mean that categorical exclusions from Second
Amendment protection “need not mirror limits that were on the books
in 1791.”100 Similarly, rather than explicitly adopt a level of constitu-
tional scrutiny, Judge Easterbrook simply picked up the government’s
concession “that some form of strong showing (‘intermediate scrutiny,’
many opinions say) is essential, and that § 922(g)(9) is valid only if
substantially related to an important governmental objective.”101
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion is noteworthy for other reasons related to
its attentiveness to the ambiguities of language and its use of those
ambiguities. After setting out the two sides’ arguments, Judge Easter-
brook explained,
We do not think it profitable to parse these passages of Heller as if
they contained an answer to the question whether § 922(g)(9) is valid.
They are precautionary language. Instead of resolving questions such
as the one we must confront, the Justices have told us that the matters
have been left open. The language we have quoted warns readers not
to treat Heller as containing broader holdings than the Court set out
to establish: that the Second Amendment creates individual rights, one
of which is keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense. What
other entitlements the Second Amendment creates, and what regula-
tions legislatures may establish, were left open. The opinion is not a
comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court’s disposi-
tion. Judicial opinions must not be confused with statutes, and general
98. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
99. Chester, 628 F.3d at 689 (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th
Cir. 2010)).
100. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
101. Id. Because of the concession by the United States, the court “need not get more
deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire, for no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9),
preventing armed mayhem, is an important governmental objective [and both] logic and
data establish a substantial relation between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.” Id. at 642; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012).
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expressions must be read in light of the subject under considera-
tion.102
As for Judge Easterbrook’s conclusion, based on dicta in Heller, that the
Justices must have meant that some exclusions could be acceptable even
if not on the books in 1791, “[t]his is the sort of message that, whether
or not technically dictum, a court of appeals must respect, given the
Supreme Court’s entitlement to speak through its opinions as well as
through its technical holdings.”103
The exercise of judgment is practical while accepting of complexity.104
In addition to these common-sense adjustments and efforts to discern
what the Supreme Court had in mind, lower courts looked for familiar
safe harbors. Many circuits adopted a two-step approach early on and
refined it over time. For example, the Fourth Circuit explained that first,
the court would ask whether the regulation burdens “conduct falling
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”105 If not, the
regulation would be valid. But if it does, the court would apply “an
appropriate form of means-end scrutiny,” with the government bearing
the burden of justification.106
As for the level of scrutiny to be applied, the courts reasoned by
elimination: “Both Heller and McDonald suggest that broadly prohibitory
laws restricting the core Second Amendment right–like the handgun
bans at issue in those cases, which prohibited handgun possession even
in the home–are categorically unconstitutional.”107 In other cases, the
lower courts are to choose “from among the heightened standards of
scrutiny the Court applies to governmental actions alleged to infringe
enumerated constitutional rights,” and the government must satisfy
whatever standard of means-end scrutiny is held to apply.108
The Seventh Circuit’s explanation became more precise by 2011.109
“First, the threshold inquiry in some Second Amendment cases will be
102. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640.
103. Id. at 641.
104. See Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 986 (“[A]n insistence on
practicality combined with an acceptance of complexity.”).
105. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.
106. Id. In Chester, the court determined that although the government had offered
reasons for “disarming” domestic violence misdemeanor offenders, it had not offered
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial relationship between the statute and an
important government goal. Id. at 681, 683.
107. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 701–04.
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a ‘scope’ question: Is the restricted activity protected by the Second
Amendment in the first place?”110 This question focuses on a “textual
and historical inquiry into original meaning,” and when state or local
government action is challenged, “the original-meaning inquiry is carried
forward in time . . . [to] how the right was understood when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”111 If the regulation falls outside
the scope at the relevant historical moment, the activity is “categorically
unprotected.”112
Second, if the regulated activity is not categorically unprotected, “there
must be a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s
justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amend-
ment rights.”113 The scrutiny applied “will depend on how close the law
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of the
law’s burden on the right.”114
As for application of this two-step approach, here is Judge Posner
determining that two Illinois statutes were unconstitutional:
The parties and the amici curiae have treated us to hundreds of pages
of argument, in nine briefs. The main focus of these submissions is
history. The supporters of the Illinois law present historical evidence
that there was no generally recognized private right to carry arms in
public in 1791, the year the Second Amendment was ratified–the
critical year for determining the amendment’s historical meaning,
according to McDonald v. City of Chicago. Similar evidence against the
existence of an eighteenth-century right to have weapons in the home
for purposes of self-defense rather than just militia duty had of course
been presented to the Supreme Court in the Heller case.115
Noting that the Supreme Court had rejected the similar evidence
submitted in Heller, Judge Posner wrote that the Seventh Circuit could
not “repudiate the Court’s historical analysis . . . . Nor can we ignore
the implication of the analysis that the constitutional right of armed
self-defense is broader than the right to have a gun in one’s home.”116
In other words, despite the uncertainty, “There is no turning back by
the lower federal courts, though we need not speculate on the limits that
Illinois may in the interest of public safety constitutionally impose on
the carrying of guns in public; it is enough that the limits it has imposed
110. Id. at 701.
111. Id. at 701-02.
112. Id. at 702-03.
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id.
115. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
116. Id.
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go too far.”117 Preferring the more familiar failure-to-meet-its burden
analysis to another textual and historical inquiry, Judge Posner
concluded:
We are disinclined to engage in another round of historical analysis to
determine whether eighteenth-century America understood the Second
Amendment to include a right to bear guns outside the home. The
Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear
arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.
The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive)
is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public
may promote self-defense. Illinois had to provide us with more than
merely a rational basis for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is
justified by an increase in public safety. It has failed to meet this
burden. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment
therefore compels us to reverse the decisions in the two cases before us
and remand them to their respective district courts for the entry of
declarations of unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.118
A very particular form of honesty and concern that all voices be well
heard and considered.119
As the lower courts worked out these disputes through rhetoric, the
judges periodically reminded one another to engage the arguments fairly
and to hear and consider all the voices around the table. In the Seventh
Circuit, Judge Sykes dissented from both the decision and Judge
Easterbrook’s characterization of Heller as not being a “code” for lower
courts to follow, but constituting instead more of an explanation.120
Calling for a fair reading of the prior opinions:
I appreciate the minimalist impulse, but this characterization of Heller
is hardly fair. It ignores the Court’s extensive analysis of the original
public meaning of the Second Amendment and understates the
opinion’s central holdings: that the Amendment secures (not “creates”)
an individual natural right of armed defense not limited to militia
service, and at the core of this guarantee is the right to keep and bear
arms for defense of self, family, and home. Heller was “the biggest
Second Amendment case ever decided,” a “landmark ruling [that]
merits our attention for its method as well as its result,” “the most
extensive consideration of the Second Amendment by the Supreme
Court in its history,” and “the most explicitly and self-consciously
117. Id. at 942.
118. Id.
119. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 986.
120. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 646 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme Court.” It is true that
Heller left many issues open, but that is not an invitation to marginal-
ize the Court’s holdings or disregard its decision method.121
When does it take a lawyer?
When the Ninth Circuit considered a version of California’s concealed-
carry gun regulation, Judge O’Scannlain wrote that “[i]t doesn’t take a
lawyer to see that straightforward application” of Heller does not resolve
the question or “that neither Heller nor McDonald speaks explicitly or
precisely to the scope of the Second Amendment right outside the home
or to what it takes to infringe’ it.”122 Characterizing the question as
whether Heller should be extended to include Second Amendment
protection for “a responsible, law-abiding citizen . . . to carry a firearm
in public for self-defense,”123 the Ninth Circuit decided the answer was
yes.124
After describing its lengthy historical and textual analysis of the
question it posed, the majority concluded that tracing the scope of the
right was dispositive: “Put simply, a law that destroys (rather than
merely burdens) a right central to the Second Amendment must be
struck down.”125 If the regulation prohibits the exercise of a core right,
“no amount of interest-balancing . . . can justify [the] policy.”126 The
Ninth Circuit majority thus endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s interpreta-
tion (in Moore) and criticized the decisions of the Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits.127 All three of the latter Circuits had “declined to
121. Id. at 647 (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)
(quoting various law review articles). Judge Sykes continued: “The court declines to be
explicit about its decision method, sends doctrinal signals that confuse rather than clarify,
and develops its own record to support the government’s application of [the challenged
statute] to this defendant.” Id.
122. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150.
123. Id. at 1181 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1178-79 (majority opinion). The Ninth Circuit held that San Diego County’s
“good cause” permitting requirement impermissibly infringed on the Second Amendment
right to bear arms in lawful self-defense. Id. at 1179. The dissenting judge objected to the
majority’s characterization of the regulation, writing that the lawsuit instead involved
California’s “longstanding restrictions” on carrying concealed weapons in public and, more
specifically, the constitutionality of San Diego County’s policy of allowing only those
persons who show good cause to carry concealed firearms in public. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. at 1167 (majority opinion).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1173-74, 1175.
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undertake a complete historical analysis of the scope and nature of the
Second Amendment right outside the home.”128
Once the historical analysis was complete, the question of unconstitu-
tionality was determined. “Because our analysis paralleled the analysis
in Heller itself, we did not apply a particular standard of heightened
scrutiny.”129 The majority nonetheless disagreed with the reasoning
of other courts when it came to their methods of applying a form of
heightened scrutiny.130 These analyses, the majority wrote, are nearly
identical “to the freestanding ‘interest-balancing inquiry’ that Justice
Breyer pro-posed–and that the majority explicitly rejected–in Hel-
ler.”131 Moreover, the other circuits erred in deferring too much to state
legislatures in their decisions about “the fit between the challenged
regulations and the asserted government interest they served.”132
The common law working itself out through “incremental change,
elaboration, and improvisation.”133
Six years after Heller and only a few months apart, two federal district
courts–one in Idaho and one in Georgia–faced the same question: does
the Second Amendment protect the rights of visitors to carry loaded
firearms on recreational property administered by the Army Corps of
Engineers? In both states, plaintiffs filed Second Amendment challenges
to the same Army Corps of Engineers regulations. Those regulations
barred the possession of loaded firearms (with certain exceptions) on all
property operated and maintained by the Corps. This property includes
128. Id. at 1173.
129. Id. at 1175.
130. Id. at 1176.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1177. The dissenting judge complained further that the majority had
answered questions that were not posed. Id. at 1179-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “In this
changing landscape, with many questions unanswered, our role as a lower court is ‘narrow
and constrained by precedent,’ and our task ‘is simply to apply the test announced by
Heller to the challenged provisions.’ ” Id. at 1180 (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia,
670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). The dissent agreed that the historical inquiry was
conclusive, but found that the answer was different. Id. at 1191. “[T]he answer to the
historical inquiry is clear: carrying a concealed weapon in public was not understood to be
within the scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment at the time of
ratification.” Id. If the right was not protected then, the regulation is constitutional. See
id.
133. MEYER, supra note 91, at 45.
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not only dams and other water control projects but also nearby
recreational areas open to the public.134
In the Idaho challenge, where the plaintiffs first sought and won a
preliminary injunction and then followed up with a motion for summary
judgment, Judge B. Lynn Winmill focused first on the scope of the
regulations: they govern more than 700 dams and surrounding
recreation areas visited by more than 300 million visitors each year.135
Judge Winmill concluded that the Heller decision had determined one
pre-existing core right: the right of a law-abiding individual to possess
a handgun in his home for self-defense.136 That core right was at issue
in the Army Corps regulations:
The same analysis [as in Heller] applies to a tent. While often tempo-
rary, a tent is more importantly a place–just like a home–where a
person withdraws from public view, and seeks privacy and security for
himself and perhaps also for his family and/or his property. Indeed, a
typical home at the time the Second Amendment was passed was
cramped and drafty with a dirt floor–more akin to a large tent than a
modern home. Americans in 1791–the year the Second Amendment was
ratified–were probably more apt to see a tent as a home than we are
today.”137
Because the Army Corps’ regulations amounted to a flat ban on carrying
a firearm for self-defense purposes, they were invalid.138
134. Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (D. Idaho 2014)
(seeking a preliminary injunction) [hereinafter Morris I]; Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, No. 3:13-CV-00336-BLW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147541, at *1-2 (D. Idaho Oct. 13,
2014) (dealing with motions for summary judgment) [hereinafter Morris II]; GeorgiaCarry.-
Org v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 4:14-CV-00139-HLM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662,
at *1-2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2014).
135. Morris II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, at *1-2; Morris I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at
1084.
136. Morris I, 990 F. Supp. at 1086.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1086-88. Judge Winmill distinguished Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475, in
which the Fourth Circuit upheld a regulation that banned loaded firearms in a National
Park, on the basis that the regulation there contained an exception for self-defense. Morris
I, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 1087. He said that the Corps’ ban was more similar to the regulation
struck down in Moore. Id. Judge Posner had described the Illinois law as “the most
restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states,” and held that it violated the Second
Amendment because it “ ‘flat[ly] ban[ned] . . . carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home’”
with no self-defense exception. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moore, 702 F.3d at 940-
41). Similarly, Judge Winmill wrote that the Corps’ regulation “contains a flat ban on
carrying a firearm for self-defense purposes. By completely ignoring the right of self-
defense, the regulation cannot be saved by the line of cases, like Masciandaro, that upheld
gun restrictions accommodating the right of self-defense.” Id.
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Later, deciding on summary judgment, Judge Winmill employed the
Ninth Circuit’s two-step analysis, but with a twist, as the analysis had
most recently been enunciated in Peruta.139 The former sliding scale
for scrutiny–depending on how close the law comes to the core of the
right and the severity of the burden–“is not used when instead of merely
burdening the right to bear arms, the law ‘destroys the right.’”140 When
a law destroys the Second Amendment right, the sliding scale analysis
is no longer used because “the law is unconstitutional ‘under any
light.’”141 The Corps’ regulation was a “complete ban” and was
unconstitutional under any degree of scrutiny.142 This result is “dictat-
ed by the law of the Ninth Circuit, namely Peruta.”143
In between the two Idaho decisions, in the Northern District of
Georgia, Judge Harold Murphy decided against issuing a preliminary
injunction to GeorgiaCarry.Org, a non-profit corporation whose “mission
is to support its member[s’] rights to keep and bear arms.”144 Judge
Murphy opened with the ambiguity surrounding “the extent to which the
Second Amendment protects individuals seeking to carry firearms
outside the home, and the framework in which courts are to evaluate
laws regulating firearm possession.”145 Like other circuits, the Elev-
enth Circuit had adopted a two-step approach and Judge Murphy
followed it: (1) “[i]s the restricted activity protected by the Second
Amendment,” and (2) if so, does the regulation survive the appropriate
level of scrutiny?146
A focus on text and a markedly different sense of its restraint.147
As required by the framework adopted by the nation’s appellate courts,
Judge Murphy began with a textual and historical analysis focusing on
the original meaning of the Second Amendment: “[w]hether, in 1791,
there was a widely accepted right to carry firearms on Defendant Army
Corps’ property?”148 First reviewing the history of the Army Corps of
Engineers and then comparing his case with the available precedent,
Judge Murphy concluded that the conduct regulated by the challenged
139. Morris II, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147541, at *3-4.
140. Id. at *4 (relying on Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168).
141. Id. (quoting Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1168).
142. Id. at *5-6.
143. Id. at *12.
144. GeorgiaCarry.Org., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, at *2.
145. Id. at *8-9 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at *10.
147. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
148. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, *11.
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regulation fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment, but “out of
an abundance of caution” went on to apply intermediate scrutiny and
found it “likely that the Firearms Regulations is [sic] reasonably suited
to advance a substantial government interest.”149
An insistence on practicality combined with an acceptance of complexi-
ty.150
As Judge Murphy put it, “[I]t is difficult, if not impossible, for a
district court faced with an emergency motion for preliminary injunction
to evaluate the contours of Second Amendment rights in colonial
America.”151 He nonetheless performed the analysis, describing the
history of the Army Corps, which was established in 1775 when
Congress organized the Continental Army and which was given the job
of overseeing fortifications and drawing maps.152 The Corps was
permanently established about twenty years later, continuing to perform
similar tasks during the War of 1812.153 Judge Murphy noted that
although the Corps began to work on civil projects early in its history,
it was still a branch of the U.S. military, and it was not until 1944 that
the Corps was authorized to construct public park and recreational
facilities at water resource development projects.154 Because the Corps
is still part of the Armed Forces and the recreational facilities are
“merely a byproduct” of dam construction projects, Judge Murphy
concluded that it was unlikely the Framers would have recognized a
civilian’s right to carry firearms on property owned and operated by the
military that was close to sensitive infrastructure projects.155
Seemingly unable to resist the criticism, he noted that the Idaho court,
in Morris, “appears to skip this step” of historical and textual analysis
and instead held that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry
firearms everywhere for self-defense purposes.156 “Respectfully,” Judge
Murphy disagreed, citing Heller for the proposition that “the pre-existing
right encompassed by the Second Amendment was not free from
locational restrictions.”157
149. Id. at *24, 31.
150. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
151. GeorgiaCarry.Org., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, at *11 n.4.
152. Id. at *12-13.
153. Id. at *13.
154. Id. at *14-15.
155. Id. at *15-16.
156. Id. at *12 n.4.
157. Id.
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A concern with the procedures by which decisions are to be made.158
Although this outcome surely depended as well on his assessment of
the merits, Judge Murphy justified his denial of the preliminary
injunction on the basis that it made sense within the particular situation
to maintain the status quo.159 This is especially true, he wrote, because
the law governing Second Amendment rights is “in its infancy” and
many of the arguments and counterarguments are “relatively untest-
ed.”160
An evaluation of positions in terms of an objective hypothetical authorita-
tive decision maker who serves as a stand-in for social judgment.161
In Jack’s formulation, the rhetorician’s concern for the quality of the
conversation, including a concern that all voices be well heard and
considered, does not preclude judgment, for he identifies as well the
characteristic of an evaluation of positions as an objective and authorita-
tive decision maker.162 This judgment Judge Murphy provided.163
After his description of the Army Corps’ history of building recreational
facilities as a byproduct of “sensitive dam construction projects nearby,”
Judge Murphy concluded that he simply “cannot fathom that the framers
of the Constitution would have recognized a civilian’s right to carry
firearms on property owned and operated by the United States Military,
especially when such property contained infrastructure products central
to our national security and well being.”164 In rejecting the Morris
court’s position that when a plaintiff pitches a tent on the Army Corps
of Engineers’ property, the tent becomes a home where the plaintiff has
a right to a loaded firearm for self-defense purposes, Judge Murphy
pointed out that plaintiffs “have no constitutional or statutory right to
pitch a tent in the first place.”165 So, he concluded, it would be “irratio-
nal” to determine that because the Corps allows tents, it must also allow
firearms in those tents.166
158. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
159. GeorgiaCrawl.Org., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, at *33-35.
160. Id. at *35.
161. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
162. Sammons, The Georgia Crawl, supra note 82, at 985-86.
163. Georgia Carry.Org, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116662, at *15.
164. Id. at *16.
165. Id. at *19-20 & n.6.
166. Id. at *20 n.6.
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Conclusion
While finishing this Article, I read a series of articles containing
stories about lawyers. These articles contrasted the story of the fictional
Atticus Finch with the history of real-life lawyers, both those who were
on the right side of civil rights struggles and those who were not,
including the lawyers who actively authorized or passively allowed the
disenfranchisement of blacks and the imposition of systems of white
supremacy.167
It is easy to agree that if my students acquire practical wisdom, they
will become better judges of the right thing to do when they are
confronted with the daily tasks and challenges of good lawyers. But how
will practical wisdom help the lawyer who finds herself working within
a historical and social setting that tells her that supporting an unequal
status quo is the right thing to do? Where does the lawyer find the
wherewithal to offer good judgment from within that context?
What I call wherewithal, Linda Meyer might call a “judgment of the
sublime–a sudden awareness that there is something we have missed,
something we do not yet know, a responsibility we have not yet fully
encompassed or articulated.”168 This awareness “may be the first
signal of a sea change in the law . . . [or] it may remain isolated.”169
Professor Meyer argues that the importance of this judgment explains
the “otherwise inexplicable deference we give to trial courts [and others]
making ‘discretionary’ decisions on the front lines of the legal sys-
tem.”170
If I had to count on such a judgment of mercy, where would I look? My
vote goes to Judge Murphy, not least because of my reading of his
opinion in GeorgiaCarry.Org. As we circle to the individual, the
particular, and the story, let me tell you a little more about Judge
Murphy. Born in 1927, he grew up in a Georgia town of 200 where the
public school was open only five months a year. So he went to elementa-
ry school and high school in a neighboring town. Near the end of World
War II, after high school and a few years of college, he entered the Navy.
167. See generally Mary Ellen Maatman, Justice Formation From Generation to
Generation: Atticus Finch and the Stories Lawyers Tell Their Children, 14 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 207 (2008); Mary Ellen Maatman, Lawyering in the Lion’s Mouth: The Story
of S.D. Redmond and Pruitt v. State, 83 MISS. L.J. 459 (2014); Mary Ellen Maatman,
Speaking Truth to Memory: Lawyers and Resistance to the End of White Supremacy, 50
HOW. L. J. 1 (2006).
168. MEYER, supra note 91, at 47.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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The Navy helped finance the rest of his college education and his nine
quarters of law school (all he needed to graduate) at the University of
Georgia. Judge Murphy began practicing law at the age of twenty-two;
he was elected to the Georgia House; he was later appointed to the state
bench, and, in 1977, to the federal bench. Since 1991, he has actively
supervised Knight v. Alabama,171 the federal lawsuit challenging
racially discriminatory policies by Alabama’s colleges and universi-
ties.172 His father was a farmer, a rural mail carrier, and a business-
man; his mother was a teacher and school principal. The Murphy family
is full of Georgia legislators, lawyers, and judges.
After decades on the federal bench, Judge Murphy said in a 2008
interview that the best part of being a judge is “the mental exer-
cise.”173 The worst part? “The difficulty of sentencing [defendants]”
while trying to be fair and responsible.174 Showing “respect [for] every
individual with whom you deal” is one of the most important qualities
of a good judge (along with knowledge of the law and the evidentiary
rules).175 And so, when a judge is sentencing a criminal defendant to
prison, “[a]t least you can treat them like a decent human being.”176 In
the end, and I imagine this must be true, “There is a loneliness” to being
a judge.177
If all we can offer as lawyers is the good judgment that comes from
our continuing trials–the trials we undergo as we seek to resolve and
solve problems through rhetoric–Judge Murphy might seem a fitting end
to my puzzle of practical wisdom. Still, an essay honoring Jack Sammons
cannot end without an allusion to baseball and to his own role as a
model of the excellence of the sport and of a particular form of practical
wisdom:
Through the playing of baseball, we come to know that disciplined
attention by a fielder to each batter is an excellence of the sport
requiring certain knowledge, skills, and virtues, some of which are the
abilities to maintain a calm temperament, to forget prior bad plays
quickly, to avoid criticism of teammates for mistakes, and so forth. For
171. 787 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ala. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 14
F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
172. See generally id.
173. Harold Murphy, Reflections on Georgia Politics Oral History Collection, RICHARD
B. RUSSELL LIBRARY FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH AND STUDIES, UNIV. OF GA. LIBRARIES
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lawyers, specific excellences of textual analysis, attention to detail,
consideration of opposing arguments, sympathetic detachment, and
general excellences of counseling, of persuasion, and of a particular
form of practical wisdom are much the same.178
178. Jack L. Sammons, The Radical Ethics of Legal Rhetoricians, 32 VAL. U. L. REV.
93, 93 (1997).
